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Case Comment
Landlord-Tenant Law: Landlord Held Negligent for
Criminal Assault by Third Party Intruder on Tenant
Plaintiff appellant was seriously injured when she was crim-
inally assaulted and robbed in the common hallway of the apart-
ment building in which she resided. When plaintiff signed her
lease, defendant landlord had provided certain security provi-
sions in the 585-unit apartment building, including a doorman, a
twenty-four hour desk attendant and other safeguards. There-
after the security precautions were reduced in spite of an in-
crease in crimes committed against the tenants in the common
areas of the building. The United States District Court held that
the landlord owed no duty to take steps to protect tenants from
the criminal acts of third parties. On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, one judge dis-
senting, holding that such a duty did in fact exist and had been
violated. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp.,
-F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Kline combines three areas of the law which historically have
been subject to a wide area of overlap: negligent torts, con-
tract and landlord-tenant. At common law it was a general rule
of negligence that without a special relationship between the
parties, such as innkeeper-guest,1 common carrier-passenger,2
business proprietor-patron3 or school district-pupil,4 there was no
duty5 to protect another from criminal attack.6 The existence of
such relationships, however, could create such a duty. For ex-
1. E.g., Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, Inc., 5 :11. App. 2d 327, 125
N.E.2d 544 (1955); Gurren v. Casperson, 147 Wash. 257, 265 P. 472 (1928).
2. E.g., Quigley v. Wilson Line of Mass., Inc., 338 Mass. 125,
154 N.E.2d 77 (1958); Sandler v. Hudson and Manhattan RJL, 8 N.J. Misc.
537, 151 A. 99 (1930), a-f'd, 108 N-.J.L. 203, 156 A. 459 (1931); Exton v.
Central R.I., 62 N.J.L. 7, 42 A. 486 (1898), aff'd, 63 N.J.L. 356, 46 A. 1099
(1899).
3. Becker v. City of Newark, 72 N.J. Super. 355, 178 A.2d 364 (App.
Div. 1962); Lee v. National League Baseball Club, 4 Wis. 2d 168, 89
N.W.2d 811 (1958).
4. McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316,
255 P.2d 360 (1953).
5. Defined as "... an obligation, to which the law will give
recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct
toward another." W. PRossER, LAW OF TOaRTs 331 (3d ed. 1964).
6. Toone v. Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 137 S.E.2d 132 (1964); Murray v.
Osenton, 126 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1961); Altepeter v. Virgil State Bank, 345
Ill. App. 585, 104 N.E.2d 334 (1952); Swinfin v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 345,
34 N.W. 22 (1887).
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ample, an employer has been held to owe a duty to his employees
to provide a place to work which will be reasonably free from
the probability of criminal attack by a third party7 although the
mere happening of a criminal attack on an employee does not
alone constitute a breach of the employer's duty to provide a safe
place to work.8 The employer is also obligated to warn the em-
ployee of latent dangers of the work, one of which may be attack
by third partiesY In a similar manner, liability is imposed on
one who establishes a business place open to the public0 or one
who assumes custody of another." On one who voluntarily un-
dertakes to protect the plaintiff, regardless of the parties' rela-
tionship, the law imposes a duty to protect.1 2 One of the theories
that give rise to the duty is the doctrine of reliance, whereby the
defendant, by his promise, has induced the plaintiff to forego
self-protective measures; thus because of his misleading under-
taking, defendant should be responsible for the consequences.'
Without some such special relationship or circumstances, how-
ever, no common law duty exists to protect another person from
criminal assaults.
In refusing to impose liability courts have not limited them-
selves solely to examination of the relationship of the parties,
7. The leading case in this area is Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459
(1947). See also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373, 86
S.E.2d 311 (1955).
8. E.g., Murray v. Osenton, 126 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1961); Lencioni v.
Long, 139 Mont. 135, 361 P.2d 455 (1961); McMillin v. Barton-Robison
Convoy Co., 182 Okla. 553, 78 P.2d 789 (1938).
9. E.g., McCalman v. Illinois C. R.R., 215 F. 465 (6th Cir. 1914);
Baxter v. Roberts, 44 Cal. 187 (1872).
10. E.g., Quinn v. Smith Co., 57 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1932) (owner of
swimming pool held to owe patrons a duty of due care for protection
from unprovoked assaults); Nance v. Ball, 134 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1961)
(bowling alley operator had duty to reasonably guard patrons from
assaults by others); Winn v. Holmes, 143 Cal. App. 2d 501, 299 P.2d 994
(1956) (restaurant owner negligent in refusing to prevent one customer
from assaulting another); Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, 83 Minn. 40, 85
N.W. 913 (1901) (operator of a public amusement park liable for as-
sault on customer); Dean v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 41 Minn. 360,
43 N.W. 54 (1899) (railway depot liable for attack on passenger by em-
ployee of a tenant of the depot).
11. E.g., Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d 141, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 892 (1962); McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash.
2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320
(1965).
12. E.g., Kansas, 0. & G. R.R. v. Pike, 264 S.W. 593 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924); Hansen v. Dodwell Dock & Warehouse Co., 100 Wash. 46,
170 P. 346 (1918).
13. E.g., Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn.
187, 196, 186 S.W. 87, 89 (1916).
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often considering "convenience of administration, capacity of the
parties to bear the loss, a policy of preventing future injuries, the
moral blame attached to the wrongdoer" 4 and the availability
and cost of insurance. The factors which have generally pre-
vented recovery in such cases are variously given labels such as
fairness, forseeability, proximate cause and the defense of in-
tervening cause, though they are not distinctly separable con-
cepts. The fairness criteria, for example, which have been cited
by courts15 are at best synonymous with the amorphous concept of
"public policy" which stresses the equity of the decision and the
complex factor analysis which goes into the consideration of
proximate cause.
The forseeability factor is involved in questions both of duty
and proximate cause'0 in the case of negligence, or the compre-
hension of the parties under contract theory. It may be exceed-
ingly difficult for the plaintiff to show that the defendant knew
or should have known that his actions could reasonably lead to
a criminal attack.17 Lack of forseeability underlies many in-
stances of inability to recover damages since a criminal act by a
third person is usually held to be not forseeable as a matter of
law.' s Forseeability is relevant in a negligence suit as it relates
to the issues of proximate and intervening cause. By defini-
tion, the defendant cannot be held liable if his actions were not
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, but beyond this
point, courts cease to agree. If the court holds that criminal acts
of third parties are unforseeable as a matter of law, defendant's
actions cannot be the proximate cause of the injury.19 Other
cases take a subjective approach to forseeability of acts by third
parties, holding that where injury is in fact forseeable to the de-
fendant, his actions constitute a nonsuperseded proximate cause
14. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 334 (3d ed. 1964). See also Green,
The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLuIn. L. R-v. 1014 (1928) &
29 COLuML L. REv. 255 (1929).
15. Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291,
293 (1962).
16. Firman v. Sacia, 7 App. Div. 2d 579, 184 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1959)
held that the outcome would be the same regardless of whether forsee-
ability was considered to be a measure of duty or proximate cause.
17. E.g., Watson v. Kentucky & Ind. Bridge & R.R. Co., 137 Ky.
619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910).
18. E.g., Sitarek v. Montgomery, 32 Wash. 2d 794, 203 P.2d 1062(1949); Fuller v. Sherry's Liquor Stores, 149 P.2d 734 (Cal. 1944); Weig-
and v. Chicago R.I & P. R.R., 121 Kan. 610, 249 P. 615 (1926).
19. E.g., Crandall v. Consolidated T., T., and Elec. Co., 14 Ariz. 322,
328, 127 P. 994, 997 (1912); Watson v. Kentucky & Ind. Bridge & R.R.
Co., 137 Ky. 619, 633-44, 126 S.W. 146, 151-53 (1910).
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of that injury.20 A detailed discussion of proximate cause is be-
yond the scope of this Comment.21
In finding a duty of protection in terms of landlord-tenant
law, and a breach of the applicable standard of care, the Kline
court admitted that as a general rule there was no duty to protect
another from the criminal acts of a third party. The court found
nevertheless that such a rule falters when applied to modern ur-
ban conditions in multi-unit dwellings where the landlord had
notice of repeated criminal acts which were likely to continue
and had the exclusive power to take preventative action 22 at least
in the common areas. The court imposed a duty on the landlord
both to maintain and repair the premises and to take protective
measures guarding "the entire premises and the areas peculiarly
under the landlord's control against the perpetration of criminal
acts .. .. 23
The court relies in part on Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Manage-
ment Co.,24 where a tenant sued for damages accruing when in-
jured by a falling ceiling on the premises. The court there held
that the enactment of the Housing Regulations 25 altered the
common law rule that a landlord had no duty to repair the prem-
ises and that a tenant had a cause of action sounding in tort
against the landlord for his failure to discharge his duty of re-
pair. This doctrine was reaffirmed in Kanelos v. Kettler,20
where the tenant's injury was attributable to the deteriorated
condition of a door sill. By the time Levine v. Katz27 was de-
cided, the principle had solidified:
20. E.g., Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 462 (1947); Wallace v.
Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d 141, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1962); Winn v.
Holmes, 143 Cal. App. 2d 501, 504-05, 299 P.2d 994, 996 (1956).
21. See Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86
U. PA. L. REv. 121 (1937); Feezer & Favour, Intervening Crime and Lia-
bility for Negligence, 24 MiNN. L. REv. 635 (1940). Other factors to be
considered are economics (Stevenson v. Kansas City, 187 Kan. 705, 711,
360 P.2d 1, 6 (1961) ); ability or inability of defendant to comply with
the duty imposed (Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, 83 Minn. 40, 43, 85
N.W. 913, 914 (1901) ), and ability or inability of the plaintiff to protect
himself (Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d 141, 144, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 892, 894 (1962) ). The tort aspects of liability of one for the crimi-
nal attacks of another are exceedingly complex. See generally Annot.,
10 A.L.R.3d 619 (1966).
22. - F.2d at -.
23. Id. at -.
24. 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
25. Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia §§ 2101, 2104,
2301, 2401 & 2501 (1956).
26. 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
27. 407 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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It has long been well settled in this jurisdiction that, where a
landlord leases separate portions of property to different ten-
ants and reserves under his own control the halls, stairs, or
other parts of the property for use in common by all tenants,
he has a duty to all those on the premises of legal right to use
ordinary care and diligence to maintain the retained parts in
a reasonably safe condition. 28
Obviously these cases are distinguishable from Kline. They all
deal with some sort of physical defects on the premises; yet the
logic behind them seems applicable, especially in the light of cases
like Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc. 29 and Ramsay v. Morris-
setteP° which held that the duty extended to cases of physical in-
trusion by third parties.
Kendall held that a landlord was negligent in having hired,
without investigation, a painter who, when given access to the
tenant's apartment, proceded to strangle the tenant. The court
held:
[I]f he [the landlord] knows, or in the exercise of ordinary
care ought to know, of a possibly dangerous situation and fails
to take such steps as an ordinarily prudent person, in view of
existing circumstances, would have exercised to avoid injury to
his tenant, he may be liable.31
In Ramsay a tenant was assaulted by an intruder who forced his
way into her apartment. The tenant alleged that the landlord
was negligent in failing to replace the full-time resident manager,
failing to apprise police of the situation, failing to install locks on
the front door and failing to prevent intruders and strangers
from sleeping in the halls. The court held that these allegations
were sufficient to preclude summary judgment for the land-
lord and relying on Kendall, stated:
The traditional duty of reasonable care under all the circum-
stances would, of course, apply to those parts of the building
used in common by all tenants where it can be shown that the
landlord was aware of a dangerous situation and took no action
either to remedy the situation or to warn the tenants of the
danger.32
A synthesis of the repair cases and the intruder cases affords the
Kline court an adequate basis for holding that as to tort law,
"[t]he rationale of the general rule exonerating a third party
from any duty to protect another from a criminal attack has no
applicability to the landlord-tenant relationship in multiple
dwelling houses."33
28. Id. at 304.
29. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
30. - D.C. Ct. App. -, 252 A.2d 509 (1969).
31. 236 F.2d 673, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
32. -. D.C. Ct. App. -, 252 A.2d 509, 512 (1969).
33. -F.2d at-.
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In establishing the landlord's duty the Kline court analogized
from the duty required of an innkeeper to exercise reasonable
care to protect the guest from assaults of third parties, 4 the the-
ory of liability being that
since the ability of one of the parties to provide for his own
protection has been limited, in some way, by his submission
to the control of the other, a duty should be imposed upon the
one possessing control (and thus the power to act) to take rea-
sonable precautions to protect the other one from assaults by
third parties which, at least, could reasonably have been an-
ticipated. 35
The analogy of the court to the innkeeper's duty to protect his
patrons, although dictum, seems to reflect the overall movement
in the law away from the old conceptualization of the lease which
was treated as a conveyance of an interest in realty, toward
viewing it as an ongoing contractual relationship. The dissent
attacks the majority's innkeeper analogy on the grounds that the
innkeeper is liable only "if, by the exercise of reasonable care,
the proprietor could have discovered that such acts were being
done or about to be done, and could have protected against the in-
jury by controlling the conduct of the other patron."3 There ap-
pear to be cases going either way on this point 37 but such criti-
cism seems moot since the standard espoused by the dissent ap-
pears to be substantially the same as that adopted by the ma-
jority. Although it has been reported that "[the modern apart-
ment dweller more closely resembles a guest in an inn than he
resembles an agrarian tenant"38 there may be some danger in
wholeheartedly adopting the innkeeper analogy. In addition to
the greater breadth of liability of an innkeeper, courts have held
him to the standard of a high degree of care to secure the safety
of his guests.3 9 One opinion stated that "[o] ne entering a hotel
'is entitled to expect that far greater preparations to secure his
safety will be made than one entering a private building'...
34. E.g., Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, Inc., 5 Ill. App. 2d 327, 125 N.E.
2d 544 (1955); Gurren v. Casperon, 147 Wash. 257, 265 P. 472 (1928) (lia-
bility for personal injury on the premises); Hancock v. Rand, 94 N.Y. 1
(1883) (liability for lost and stolen goods); Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cal. 221,
52 Am. Dec. 303 (1850).
35. - F.2d at -.
36. Id. at -.
37. See Annot. A.L.R.2d 628 (1960). The prevailing view appears
to be that reasonable care is required.
38. J. LEVI, P. HALBUTZEL, L. ROSENBERG & S. WHITE, MODERN RESI-
DENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE 6, 7 (Tent. draft 1969).
39. Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, Inc., 5 Ill. App. 2d 327, 331, 125 N.E.
2d 544, 546 (1955); Wilson v. Iberville Amusement Co., Inc., 181 So. 817,
818 (1938).
40. Schubart v. Hotel Astor, Inc., 168 Misc. 431, 435, 5 N.Y.S.2d 203,
1102 [Vol. 55:1097
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The danger is that the landlord would be made an insurer of his
tenant's safety, consequently causing higher rental costs, an
outcome which the majority expressly disavows.
One of the factors given special consideration in deciding the
outcome of Kline was whether or not the commission of the crime
was forseeable. Relying on the record to establish that the ten-
ants were being subjected to an increasing number of crimes in
the hallway of the building, the court found that the landlord had
both constructive and actual notice of the pattern of crime. The
court distinguished such cases as Goldberg v. Housing Author-
ity,41 which held that the landlord had no duty to protect his ten-
ants. Goldberg dealt with a provision of actual police protection,
and was based on a statutory interpretation that a private person
had no statutory right to employ a police force, this being a func-
tion of government. As the majority in Kline points out, the
Goldberg court appears to equate "possible" with "probable"
crime and thereby declined to allow that a criminal act could be
"forseeable." Goldberg was countered in New York by Bass v.
City of New York,42 a case in which the controlling statute al-
lowed the housing unit, at its discretion, to provide and maintain
a uniformed police force. Under these circumstances when a
young girl was raped and killed, it was held that the proprietor
had a duty to provide adequate protection to secure tenants
against molestation. The only difference between the two fact
situations was the statutory policing authority alloted the re-
spective proprietors under the laws of New York and New Jersey.
The record in Kline indicates that at trial the defendant con-
ceded his notice of offenses committed in the building. The dis-
sent attempts to show that the notice was insufficient because
there was only one assault and robbery, and 19 thefts rather than
20 assaults and robberies, which is felt to be "an insufficient base
to support a finding that assaults and robberies are a 'predicta-
ble risk' from which the landlord would have 'every reason to
expect like crimes to happen again.'- 43 It has been held, how-
ever, that as the gravity of the possible harm increases, the ap-
parent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly
less.44 To say that "[a]ssaults of this character are not pre-
207, afj'd, 255 App. Div. 1012, 8 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1938), affd, 281 N.Y. 597,
22 N.E.2d 167 (1939).
41. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
42. 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1969).
43. -- F.2d at - & n.2.
44. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947).
1971] 1103
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
dictable from clandestine thefts,"'45 when one considers the po-
tential gravity of the presence of intruders on the premises, is
insensitive and unrealistic.
The Kline court based the landlord's duty on three factors.
The first is the economic reality of the situation, that is, that the
landlord is the only one in a position to take the necessary pro-
tective measures required. They indicate their disagreement
with Goldberg by noting that the landlord is in a better position
than the police to provide the necessary protective measures.
The court relies heavily upon Kendall v. Gore Properties,40 a
case where the landlord's employee strangled to death a tenant,
for the proposition that
the landlord does not become a guarantor of the safety of his
tenant. But, if he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care
ought to know, of a possibly dangerous situation and fails to
take such steps as an ordinarily prudent person, in view of ex-
isting circumstances, would have exercised to avoid injury to
his tenant, he may be liable.47
Second, building on Levine,48 Kendall49 and Javins v. First Na-
tional Realty Co.,50 the court alternatively held that the duty
arises out of an implied contract that the landlord will provide
those protective measures reasonably within his capability.
Since the tenant continued to pay the same rent, and even
though after the first year's lease expired the tenant went to a
month to month tenancy, she was entitled at least to the protec-
tion which existed at the beginning of the term.51 Third, the
court cited the innkeeper-guest relationship as being closely
analogous to that of the modern urban tenant and his landlord
with respect to the tort duties of the landlord.
After establishing the existence of a duty owed to the ten-
ant, the court turned to the question of the standard of care to
be used. They establish a standard of care reasonable under all
the circumstances, but then go on to obfuscate the standard by
equivocally holding:
[T]he applicable standard of care in providing protection for
the tenant is that standard which this landlord himself was
employing in October 1959 when the appellant became a resi-
45. - F.2d at -.
46. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
47. Id. at 680. See also Ramsay v. Morissette, - D.C. Ct. App. -,
252 A.2d 509 (1969).
48. 407 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
49. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
50. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3227 (1970).
51. This aspect of the argument seems less than sound as today's
rents continue to rise steeply.
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dent on the premises .... The tenant was led to expect that
she could rely upon this degree of protection. 52
The court recognizes that appellant's attempts to introduce the
standard of protection commonly provided in apartment build-
ings of the same character and class as appellant's had been
wrongfully frustrated by the trial judge and opposing counsel.
The court indicated that the obligation to use this standard is the
same whether the duty is grounded in tort or contract,53 but
failed to realize that they had stated two distinct standards. It
was an implied obligation of the lease contract as well as a rea-
sonable standard in conjunction with the protection commonly
provided in apartment buildings of that character.
The standard enunciated is sufficiently indefinite to raise a
question of its exact scope. "Reasonable care under the circum-
stances" is the classic tort standard of care and the court indi-
cates it will vary with the facts of individual cases. Whether
the landlord's obligation was grounded in tort or in contract
based on the lease is inconsequential. This appears to be a con-
ceptually untenable position unless the court meant that the
standard holds only for this particular set of facts. If the duty
sounds in contract, the underlying obligation is implied from
the lease and the initial standard which the tenant was led to
rely upon is the measure of that duty; while if it sounds in tort
the standard commonly provided in apartments of this class and
character in the community should be applied. As the dissent
points out, if the contract standard is used, the tenant theoreti-
cally has no recourse since after the first year's tenancy the lease
ran on a month to month basis, a new contract being created
each period. This would seem to imply that the standard would
change to conform with the condition of the premises at the be-
ginning of each month. Appellant was able to observe the
changes which occurred in the premises over a period of time.
Her recovery under this rule would seem to be limited to the
standard in existence at the beginning of the month in which the
assault occurred since by continuing to pay rent she arguably
ratified the diminished security.
52. - F.2d at -.
53. Id. at -. More often than not, it is to the advantage of the
'plaintiff to invoke the tort remedy since it will allow a greater measure
of recovery. Contract law normally allows damages for breach only to
the extent of those within the contemplation of the defendant at the
making of the agreement. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Fx. 341, 156 Eng.
Reps. 145 (1854). In tort, the only limitation of damages is that of
proximate causation.
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The tort standard-the protection provided in apartment
buildings of the same character and class as appellant's-also
raises some perplexing questions. It implies that a slum tenant
is entitled to no better protection than that provided in the slum
area, which usually means none at all. This aids least those who
need aid most. Indigent tenants5 4 are unable to move to a place
which provides better security. Moreover, under varying cir-
cumstances either of the standards, tort or contract, may be
higher than the other. For example, if a landlord's building pro-
vided little or no protection at the inception of a lease term, and
other buildings of like character did provide adequate protective
measures, under a reliance standard a tenant would be entitled
to less protection than under an industry custom standard. Is a
tenant to be entitled only to the lesser standard if there is a
choice? The court fails to anticipate this possibility and conse-
quently fails to suggest a solution. It is possible that the lack of
an unambiguous standard would force the landlord either to
adopt the highest standard of care, and in effect become an in-
surer of the safety of his tenants (an outcome which the ma-
jority explicitly rejects), or attempt to contract out of liability
through a lease provision, an attempt which is arguably prohib-
ited by the Javins decision.55
Having found the duty and establishing the standard of care,
the court determined that the landlord had failed to discharge
his duty. They found the risk to have been predictable, the land-
lord to have had notice of that risk and the means of avoiding it.
The court was quick to emphasize that the ruling did not make
the landlord an insurer of the safety of his tenants, or force him
to provide protection commonly provided by municipal police.
He was only to do what was reasonably within his power and ca-
pacity to do under the circumstances. Before reversing and re-
manding to the district court for the determination of damages,
the court held that the landlord was justified in passing on the
54. THE U.S. NATIONAL COMMAISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION
OF VIOLENCE: To ESTABLISH JUSTICE, TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY 15
(1969), reports that urban blacks make up the vast majority of persons
arrested for murder, rape, assault and robbery, and that the victims in
most cases are also blacks. Roughly 66 percent of the homicides and
assaults, and 60 percent of the rapes are black against black.
55. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3227 (1970).
It has been held that a lease clause is invalid if it would insulate
landlords "from the consequences of violations of their duties to the
public under both the common law and the District of Columbia Build-
ing Code . . . ." Tenants Council v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560,
563 (D.D.C. 1969).
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costs of installment of protective devices to the tenant. A fur-
ther difficulty, raised by the dissent, is that the court may have
been mistaken in deciding that the standard had been violated
here as a matter of law. After laying down new rules of law, the
court should have remanded to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings, applying the new rule to the evidence in the case. Ap-
parently findings of fact were not made at the trial level since
the district court had ruled that the landlord had no duty as
a matter of law. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ap-
plied its newly announced duty to a record substantially devoid
of evidentiary materials.
Neither the majority nor the dissent address the question of
whether the tenant could have been found to be contributorily
negligent or whether she might have assumed the risk in issue.
In discussing the District of Columbia Housing Regulations,
Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co.50 held that the Regula-
tions create "a duty of care which the appellant [tenant] owes to
herself. Breach of this duty is likewise at least evidence of con-
tributory negligence." 57  Consequently, "recovery would be
barred if... the tenant unreasonably exposed herself to danger
by failing to vacate the premises. ... ,,8 The Whetzel court re-
iterates that knowledge of the defect is a circumstance relevant
to the determination of contributory negligence.
Kanelos v. Kettler5 9 dealt with the assumption of risk in the
present context. The court, citing the Restatement (Second) of
Torts6" states that "[r]isks ... are assumed ... because the
claimant, with knowledge of the risk and full appreciation of its
dangers, is willing to accept and gamble on it."' The key is
whether the action is voluntary-it is not voluntary where the
defendant's tortious conduct has forced plaintiff to choose be-
tween courses of conduct which leave him no reasonable alterna-
tive to taking his chances. If plaintiff has to choose between
evils, his exercise of choice cannot be held against him.02  The
doctrine of assumption of risk is barred "where the plaintiff...
is compelled to accept the risk in order to exercise or protect a
right of privilege, of which the defendant has no privilege to de-
56. 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
57. Id. at 950.
58. Id.
59. 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
60. § 496 E, comment a (1965).
61. 406 F.2d 951, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
62. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS, § 496 E, comment c (1965).
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prive him. ' 63  It is ultimately held that the responsibilities
placed upon landlords by the Housing Regulations should not be
nullified by the mere circumstance that the tenant remains in
possession. 4 This would seem to indicate that failure to move,
without other circumstances, would be inadequate evidence of as-
sumption of risk.
The conduct of the tenant apparently was not put in issue
in Kline, which accounts for the silence of the court in regard to
contributory negligence or assumption of risk. Tenant was
aware of the crimes being committed on the premises. The rec-
ord indicates that she had discussed the problem with the land-
lord's agent, and police reports periodically showed that the
crimes were an almost daffy occurrence. 65 The inevitable ques-
tion is whether it would be reasonable to require tenant to move
from the premises. As stated in one concurring opinion:
"[O] ne's acceptance of a risk of harm created by another's non-
performance of duty does not represent a free choice where there
is no feasible alternative save to sacrifice an interest which the
duty exists ultimately to subserve." 66 It seems likely that had
the issue been raised, the court would have found that failure to
move was not unreasonable under the circumstances, and that
to find an assumption of risk would in this case have defeated
the affirmative responsibilities placed on the landlord.
Kline could have been decided handily on the basis of exist-
ing tort law in the District of Columbia. What makes the case so
unusual is that the court chose to blend tort theory with land-
lord-tenant law, using an implied warranty of habitability in
the lease to buttress the imposition of a duty on the landlord.
Landlord-tenant law has consistently been structured by the
historical view which treated a lease as a conveyance of land free
from implied covenants and warranties, subject to certain nar-
rowly defined exceptions. Certain recent cases have indicated a
liberalization of the common-law doctrines, emphasizing a prefer-
ence for treating the apartment dweller's lease as a contract sub-
ject to express and implied warranties which may be inferred
from the municipal housing codes. 67
63. Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
64. Id. at 956.
65. - F.2d at - n.4.
66. Hewitt v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 404 F.2d 1247, 1255 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (concurring opinion).
67. For a concise discussion of the historical development in this
area see Comment, 39 CiN. L. REv. 600 (1970); Comment, 55 MINN.
L. REv. 354 (1970).
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In the District of Columbia this "revolution" resulted in
Javins v. First National Realty Corp.1s which stressed the neces-
sity of considering a lease as a contractual relationship rather
than a conveyance of land, and which recognized the existence
of an implied warranty of habitability creating a duty on the
landlord to maintain and repair the premises. From Javins,19
Levine70 and Kendall,71 the court extracts the rule that there is
an implied covenant in the contract between landlord and tenant
which places on the landlord a continuing obligation to provide
those protective measures which are reasonably within his ca-
pacity.
There is no doubt that apartment dwellers are in need of
greater protection in their buildings. 7 2 The question is whether
tort law sufficies to provide this protection or whether it is neces-
sary to resort to implied warranties. Such a warranty was said
in Javins7 s to be implied by operation of law into leases of urban
dwelling units covered by the District of Columbia Housing Reg-
ulations. By the signing of the lease, the landlord was held to
have undertaken a continuing obligation to the tenant to main-
tain the premises in accordance with all applicable law. Con-
tract principles were to govern the landlord's failure to meet his
duties and the tenant's obligation to pay rent was conditioned on
the landlord's performance. It was also held in Javins 4 that
the parties could not contract out of liability by the introduction
of an exculpatory clause. It should be noted that the Housing
Regulations are silent on the landlord's duty to protect." Con-
68. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3227 (1970).
69. Id.
70. 407 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
71. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
72. The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence report, supra note 54, indicates that violent crime is particu-
larly rampant in the major cities. More than half of the reported
crimes come from 26 cities each with populations in excess of 500,000.
A special police department crime analysis study in New York City
found that about two-thirds of the robberies reported occur inside build-
ings, most frequently in the hallways, lobbies, and elevators of apart-
ment houses, necessitating new patrol tactics such as block sweeps, in
which a police team suddenly moves into an especially dangerous
block and searches the public places-roofs, hallways, elevators, lob-
bies and cellars-of all apartment houses. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1969, at
1, Col 8.
73. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3227 (1970).
74. Id. at 1081-82.
75. Section 2304 reads, "No persons shall rent or offer to rent any
habitation, or the furnishings thereof, unless such habitation and its
furnishings are in a clean, safe, and sanitary condition, in repair and
free from rodents and vermin" (emphasis added). Section 2501 reads
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ceivably the language of section 2501 of the Housing Code 70 re-
quiring that premises be healthy and safe could be construed to
address the protection of the tenant, but it is more likely that the
draftsmen of the Regulations intended it to refer to physical
shortcomings in the buildings. On the other hand, a lack of pro-
tective devices may be considered a physical defect, and indeed,
the Kline court cites the language of Javins to the effect that ten-
ants seek
a well-known package of goods and services-a package which
includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat,
light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure
windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper mainte-
nance.
77
It is therefore an open question whether the Regulations extend
to require protective devices. Should tort remedies prove un-
available, the tenant is forced to rely on a forced interpretation
of the Regulations. If the Housing Regulations are meant to re-
quire provision of security, they should clearly so state to obviate
the necessity of judicial manipulation of ambiguous language.
There are further consequences of such ambiguity. The court,
for example, recalled that Javins prevents the landlord from
exculpating himself from liability in the lease. This is clearly
correct in the Javins situation which clearly falls within the am-
bit of the Regulations, but it seems questionable whether the
landlord should also be prohibited from contracting out of lia-
bility for failure to provide protective devices, which are not
clearly within the scope of the Housing Regulations.
What the court appears to be doing is creating judicially,
what is in effect welfare legislation. Superficially, the land-
lord alone is in the position to take the necessary protective steps
required. It is probably correct that as between the landlord
and the police the landlord is better able to protect his tenants
in his building; but it is also correct that a legislative remedy-
more police and higher welfare rent allowances payments-
would serve to shift some of this heavy burden from the land-
lord. It may be, in fact, a severe burden. On the basis of Javins,
not only can plaintiff Kline refuse to pay a portion of her rent,
"Every premises accommodating one or more habitations shall be main-
tained and kept in repair so as to provide decent living accommodations
for the occupants. This part of the Code contemplates more than mere
basic repairs and maintenance to keep out the elements; its purpose is
to include repairs and maintenance designed to make a premises or
neighborhood healthy and safe" (emphasis added).
76. Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia § 2501 (1956).
77. - F.2d at -.
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but the remaining 584 occupants can likewise withhold rent pay-
ments. This offers the landlord two choices. He can refuse to
add the devices, go out of business, and force his tenants to relo-
cate in substantially identical slum tenements, if openings can
be found. Or he can install the devices and pass the expense
along to the tenants, absent some form of rent control, who are
least able to afford the additional expense.7 8 The other side of
the coin is the added expense of insuring apartments, and the fi-
nancial and human cost of assaults and robberies. The court's
remedies seem to be stopgap at best, and the alternative appears
to be legislative action to provide more efficient and extensive
crime control and prevention. This equitably spreads the bur-
den over the whole community rather than just the landlord and
tenant, because it is the community at large, and not merely the
landlords and tenants, which is the ultimate beneficiary.
78. Assume that under slum conditions a tenant pays $60.00 per
month for an apartment in a hundred unit tenement. To provide one
day guard and one night guard would cost approximately $10,000 per
year per guard, or $20,000. This would result in a cost of $200.00 more
per year per unit or $15.00 to $20.00 per month. Electrical devices
have a comparable cost basis. This burden can be spread over a much
wider area, the community, by better and more extensive law enforce-
ment.
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